Eighteen. That's how many enterprise blockchain ventures Paul Brody says he turned up with a quick web and history search, all of them dead or quietly converted into something else. Brody runs Nightfall Networks, and in an opinion piece published by Cointelegraph on Nov. 15 he argues the corpses were early, not wrong.
I think he's half right, and the right half is the more interesting one. If you hold ETH, or just wonder whether big companies will ever settle anything onchain, it's the half that touches you.
A Dog Food Defense of a Dead Idea
Brody opens with Pets.com. The site raised $110 million from Amazon and other backers to sell pet toys and kibble online, then flamed out. The lesson everyone took was that nobody can profitably mail a 50‑pound bag of dog food. Yet Chewy, which sells exactly that, booked roughly $12.6 billion of revenue last fiscal year and turned a profit of about $223 million.
So the concept was fine. The logistics, the customer habits and the unit economics just hadn't shown up yet.
His claim is that enterprise blockchain is in the same spot. Between 2017 and 2023, he says, crypto probably burned as much money on corporate chains as Pets.com did on its whole adventure, maybe more. The people doing it weren't delusional, in his telling. They were ahead of their tools.
It's a tidy analogy, and tidy analogies deserve suspicion. Plenty of dead ideas stay dead. Still, the specific reason he gives for the failures is concrete enough to test.
What Companies Wanted From a Shared Ledger
Start with the problem, which was always real. Business systems tend to break where one company ends and another begins.
Brody sketches two ways that goes wrong. In the first, every firm runs its own islands of software and they swap information through email attachments and spreadsheets. Cheap to set up, permanently a little bit wrong. In the second, a dominant buyer or manufacturer invites suppliers into its own always‑on network. That works well and costs a fortune, and the suppliers end up locked inside someone else's walls. He compares the feeling to a corporate version of Stockholm syndrome.
A shared ledger promised a third option: real‑time visibility and common business rules without a landlord. Around 2017 that looked obvious. Money poured in, consortia formed, press releases went out.
The casualty list is long. Shipping platform TradeLens is on it, along with trade‑finance networks We.Trade and Contour, the insurance consortium B3i, Australia's ASX CHESS replacement and the provenance startup Everledger. Some had backers like Deutsche Bank, HSBC and IBM. The pedigree saved none of them.
Enterprise Blockchain Failed on Privacy, Not Ambition
Here is the heart of Brody's argument, and the part I'd spend the most time on.
No company wants a rival reading its order flow. A public chain shows everything to everyone by default, so early builders reached for permissioned networks (private chains where only approved members get in) and then bolted on workarounds to hide data from participants who weren't supposed to see it. Brody's verdict: the workarounds were unnatural, and the results came out slow, expensive and unloved.
Here's what that means in practice. A permissioned chain run by a handful of banks is, functionally, a database with extra meetings. You give up the openness that justified a blockchain in the first place and keep the coordination headaches. Then you add custom privacy layers, which means more engineering, more audits, more places to stall. Every member also has to agree on governance: who pays, who votes, what happens when a rival joins. That's before a single shipping container gets tracked.
Seen that way, the failures look less like eighteen stories and more like one story told eighteen times. Brody is careful to say each case has its own nuance. But the through line he draws is that privacy was missing at the base layer, so everyone improvised.
I'd push on this a little. Getting competitors to share a governance table is hard with or without cryptography, and I doubt a better zero‑knowledge proof (a way to prove a fact without revealing the data behind it) fixes a boardroom stalemate. Some of the dead names also ran into plain commercial resistance, the kind where an incumbent has no reason to help a shared utility succeed. I read the piece twice and couldn't find Brody claiming privacy alone would have saved them. His framing could still leave a reader with that impression.
He's on firmer ground with the aftermath. The few survivors, he says, have "de‑chained" themselves, dropping the blockchain and reverting to ordinary software‑as‑a-service (rented software, basically). The customers who tested those systems mostly walked away with a blunt conclusion: we tried blockchain, it didn't work.
That's the real damage. A failed pilot in a corporate innovation lab doesn't just end a project. It ends the appetite for the next one, sometimes for years. If Brody is right that the tools have changed, the first obstacle won't be technology. It will be convincing a procurement officer who already got burned.
One more thing to weigh: Brody's company sells into this exact market. That doesn't make him wrong, and he's open about where he works. But a founder arguing the moment has arrived is a founder with a stake in the moment arriving.
Fees Fell and Capacity Grew
The second leg of his case is raw capacity, and the numbers are easy to follow.
In 2020, he writes, Ethereum handled roughly 1 million transactions a day, and when demand spiked a single transaction could cost $30 to $50. Today most settle for less than a penny, and capacity is climbing toward billions a day. He says nobody argues about the scalability trilemma (the old worry that a chain can't be decentralized, secure and fast all at once) anymore, and that Ethereum is both decentralized and scaled.
I'd soften that last bit. "Nobody" is doing a lot of work, and decentralization is a spectrum people still fight over. The fee drop isn't in dispute, though, and it matters for a plain reason. A supply chain or trade‑finance flow that generates thousands of small updates can't live on a network where each one costs a lunch.
Brody also points to better privacy tooling and deeper onchain liquidity as part of the shift. Liquidity is the one I'd watch, since it's the least glamorous. A corporate treasurer won't settle invoices onchain because the tech is elegant. They'll do it if the money on the other side is there and they can move in and out without paying a toll. Settlement assets that behave like cash, available around the clock, draw more than any architecture diagram.
What to Watch Before Believing Him
The pitch hangs on three things, and each can be checked.
First, does native privacy work at business scale? Not in a demo, but with a real buyer and a real supplier who distrust each other. Second, do large companies agree to try again after the last round of failed pilots? Third, does anyone build something that survives past the press release, which is where the 2017 wave ran aground?
Then there are the survivors who went back to SaaS. If some of them move onto public infrastructure, that would say more than any op‑ed. If none do, Brody's second chance may belong to a new crop of builders, not the old names.
Chewy took about two decades to prove the dog food thesis. Enterprise blockchain won't get that long. The tools look better than they did in 2020, but the first shipper or bank to report a boring, profitable result will do more for the argument than any analogy.






